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Abstract
We analyse the eﬀects of diﬀerent regulatory schemes (price cap
and proﬁt sharing) on a ﬁrm’s investment of endogenous size. Using a
real option approach in continuous time, we show that proﬁt sharing
does not delay a ﬁrm’s start-up investment relative to a pure price
cap scheme. Proﬁt sharing does not necessarily aﬀect total invest-
ment either, if the threshold for proﬁt sharing is high enough. Only
ap r o ﬁt sharing intervening for low proﬁt levels may delay further
investments. We also evaluate the eﬀects of proﬁt sharing on social
welfare, determining the level of proﬁt that should optimally trigger
tighter regulation: proﬁt sharing should be less stringent in sectors
where there are bigger investment opportunities.
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11 Introduction
The performance of regulated utilities has raised concern about how to rec-
oncile consumer protection and the incentive to invest. The most popular
solution among regulators is the (by now traditional1) RPI−x scheme, which
makes the regulated price insensitive to cost-reducing investments: in this
way, ﬁrms which reduce their costs are not immediately penalized. However,
sometimes this rule allows the ﬁrm to keep huge proﬁts, and there are now
many cases where price cap regulation is modiﬁed with an earnings sharing
clause, whereby if proﬁts are too high there is an automatic mechanism which
revises prices to the beneﬁt of consumers (Sappington, 2002). On the other
hand, such a redistribution of beneﬁts from the ﬁrms to the consumers has
been accused of decreasing the incentive to invest (among others, Weisman
(1993) or Lyon (1996) and Mayer and Vickers (1996)), although the evidence
is fairly mixed2.
Our paper contributes to this debate using modern investment theory,
which stresses the importance of irreversibility, and calls for a set-up where
investment timing and uncertainty play a substantial role.3 While previous
theoretical results show that proﬁt sharing decreases the incentive to invest,
the results we obtain may explain the ambiguity of the empirical evidence,
in that we show that proﬁt sharing schemes may or may not decrease invest-
ment, depending on the actual level of proﬁtw h i c ht r i g g e r sp r o ﬁt sharing.
An additional contribution of the paper is that we carry out a fully-ﬂedged
welfare analysis which allows us to identify when the potential losses from
proﬁt sharing (delayed investment) are more than compensated by the gains
1According to this scheme, the regulated price should start from a given level, and then
increase at a rate equal to the diﬀerence between the expected inﬂation rate (the Retail
Price Index, RPI) and an exogenously given component (x). See Beesley and Littlechild
(1989).
2See, for example, Ai and Sappington (2002) and Gasmi et al. (1999). The fact
that in several cases proﬁt sharing may lead to greater eﬃciency relative to other forms of
regulation (e.g. a pure price cap) raises a problem, given that the existing theory indicates
otherwise.
3Investment timing is often left to the ﬁrm’s discretion. For instance, upon the request
of the EC, McKinsey conducted an assessment of 3G licenses in the European Union. Some
contracts did not even mention a timing for service launch (Germany, The Netherlands,
Sweden). In the UK the date of service launch was explicitly left to the operators’ com-
mercial discretion. In those Member States with short-term rollout requirements, delay
relaxations already occurred. Similar relaxations are also expected in Member States with
longer-term requirements (European Commission, 2002).
2in terms of allocative eﬃciency and welfare distribution (higher consumer
surplus). The optimal level at which proﬁt sharing should intervene can thus
be characterised. As long as marginal productivity of capital does not de-
crease too slowly, proﬁts h a r i n gi sa l w a y so p t i m a le v e ni fi td e l a y si n v e s t m e n t .
Proﬁts h a r i n gs h o u l di n t e r v e n ea th i g h e rl e v e l so fp r o ﬁt when investment op-
portunities are bigger and when the weight of proﬁts in the welfare function
is higher.
This paper is linked to two streams of literature. The ﬁr s to n ei st h et r a -
ditional theory of investment under regulation, where investment (“eﬀort”)
is modelled in a static framework where the ﬁrm knows exactly the return
from its investment (e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole, 1986). The same approach was
taken by several papers which compare price caps and proﬁt sharing rules,
showing that a pure RPI − x system provides better incentives to invest
relative to a price cap with proﬁt sharing (e.g. Lyon, 1996).4
However, while investment in managerial eﬀort is typically reversible,
investment in physical assets is not. When irreversibility matters, a static
model is no longer appropriate and the decision to invest should be modelled
in a dynamic framework, where the option value of investment is explicitly
considered. We operate along this line, and we show that what matters
to investment is not proﬁt sharing per se, but the proﬁt level which triggers
proﬁt sharing: a “soft” proﬁt sharing constraint does not reduce the incentive
to invest.
The second stream of literature is the one on investment and irreversibil-
ity (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), which introduces real options. However, only
a few articles in this area derive policy implications using this setting. A no-
table exception is Dixit (1991), who shows that a price ceiling aﬀects one-oﬀ
investment strategies by perfectly competitive ﬁr m so n l yi fi ti sl o we n o u g h .
Although consistent with our result, Dixit’s ﬁnding does not refer to a nat-
ural monopoly and above all it does not include an earnings sharing clause
in the price constraint.
Real option techniques are used more and more in analysing regulated
sectors. For instance, Hausman and Myers (2002) claim that over the 1997-
2000 period the revenues of the three major U.S. railroads were inadequate,
since the existing regulatory constraint did not take correct account of sunk
4Weisman (1993) shows that when price cap rules incorporate an element of proﬁt
sharing, price caps may even represent a worsening relative to a pure cost-based regulation,
a notoriously ineﬃcient set-up.
3costs and irreversible investment. A similar point is made by Pindyck (2004),5
who criticizes the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 as it “ignores the
basic fact that sunk costs do matter in decision-making when those costs
have yet to be sunk” [p.12]6. Another interesting contribution is Teisberg
(1993), who studies rate of return regulation. More recently, Panteghini and
Scarpa (2003a) use a simple framework to show that modifying a price cap
with an element of proﬁt sharing does not aﬀect the incentive to make an
investment of a given amount. However the above articles are based on the
assumption that the investment size is exogenous.
Along this line, a particularly relevant paper is Dobbs (2004), which
analyses price cap regulation of a ﬁr me n d o w e dw i t hm a r k e tp o w e r ,a n d
shows that a monopoly ﬁrm generally under-invests. While Dobbs concen-
trates on the eﬀects of an optimal price cap, here we compare diﬀerent regula-
tory schemes. In this set-up, we investigate how the two regimes we consider
aﬀect investment. Moreover, we perform a welfare analysis, which allows us
to derive optimally the proﬁt level which should trigger earnings sharing.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the ba-
sic continuous time model. Section 3 studies an investment of endogenous
size, made by a natural monopolist, under both price cap and proﬁts h a r -
ing regulation. Section 4 provides a welfare analysis, while the ﬁnal section
summarizes the results and discusses possible extensions.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a regulated utility (e.g. a gas distributor or a motorway conces-
sionaire) which has to decide whether, when and how much to invest in a new
project. After the initial investment, the utility can upgrade it, with further
extensions or quality improvements which have a (set-up) cost, but increase
the (variable) proﬁt margin of the ﬁrm. The investment is irreversible, in
that its cost cannot be recovered.
The timing of the investment is decided by the ﬁrm. As this utility faces
uncertainty (the potential demand varies over time in a way which is hard to
forecast) it may thus postpone the investment to a moment in which it feels
5On this point see also Evans and Guthrie (2005).
6There is also mounting evidence of how much real options can aﬀect investment deci-
sions in the energy sector. See, for example, Keppo and Lu (2003), Saphores et al. (2004),
Hlouskova et al. (2005) and Nasakkala and Fleten (2005).
4relatively safer about its proﬁtability.
In order to study such an investment problem and its relationship with
both uncertainty and irreversibility, the minimum ingredients of the model
must include a stochastic element and a dynamic structure, where time plays
an explicit role. This calls for a dynamic stochastic model, which may be
formally complex, but is however necessary to study both uncertainty and
irreversibility. Following an established literature,7 we thus apply a contin-
uous time model of investment for a ﬁrm, subject to a regulatory constraint
on its price. The following assumptions are introduced.




with γ,η > 0.T i m ei sac o n t i n u o u sv a r i a b l e .
The ﬁrm Only one ﬁrm operates in this market, maximizing expected
proﬁts over an inﬁnite time horizon. In each t,i t sp a y o ﬀ is
Πt = Ψ(Kt)ptqt (2)
where Kt ∈ (0,K] is the ﬁrm’s asset or “capital”, where K represents the
maximum eﬃcient investment that the current technology allows.8 The
function Ψ(Kt) describes the eﬀects of capital accumulation on the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability. This term can be thought of as a mark-up, so that investment
can be interpreted either as cost-reducing or as quality-enhancing. On this
term we assume Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ(K) ≤ 1, ΨK > 0 and ΨKK < 0.
Regulation On the new project considered (e.g. a new motorway or
railway line) the monopolist is subject to price regulation, and we consider
two alternatives. The basic one is an RPI − x,w h e r e b yi ft h eﬁrm starts
producing at time zero, the initial price p0 > 0 is given, and price dynamics
are deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate (changes in the retail
price index, RPI) and an exogenous factor xl :
pt = p0e
(RPI−xl)t. (3)
7The traditional reference is Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
8The value of K may or may not be ﬁnite (in some cases, it may be so large that
its existence becomes irrelevant). None of the following results depend on this. For a
discussion on limited expandability, see Dixit and Pindyck (2000).
5The second alternative we consider is proﬁt sharing, whereby when prof-
its reach a given threshold, e Π,ah i g h e rx factor applies9.P r o ﬁt sharing is
therefore deﬁned as a modiﬁcation of (3), as follows
pt = p0e
(RPI−xj)t where xj =
(
xl if Π ≤ e Π,
xh if Π > e Π,
(4)
with xl <x h. These parameters are known in advance by all market partici-
pants, and they are set irreversibly.
Uncertainty Demand uncertainty is a crucial matter for regulated ﬁrms.10
We model this aspect assuming that the parameter γt in (1) is stochastic and
follows a geometric Brownian motion
dγt = σqγtdzt, (5)
where σq is the variance parameter, and dzt is the increment of a Wiener
process satisfying the conditions that E(dzt)=0and E(dz2
t)=dt. Therefore
E(dγt)=0and E(dγ2
t)=( σqγt)2dt. This means that, starting from γ0 > 0,
the random position of γt at time t>0 has a normal distribution with mean
γ0 and variance γ2
0(eσ2t − 1), which is increasing in t.
Our model focuses on demand uncertainty. It is worth noting that intro-
ducing uncertainty on the productivity of investment in the form of technical
obsolescence would not aﬀect the quality of results.11
9There are other possibilities for modelling proﬁt sharing; see Sappington and Weisman
(1996) and Schmalensee (1989) for (qualitatively analogous) formulations.
10For instance, highway traﬃc is largely beyond the franchise holder’s control, its fore-
casts are notoriously imprecise, especially in the long term (Engel, Fisher and Galetovic,
2001). Something similar holds for railways investments. See for instance World Bank
and Inter-American Development Bank (1998, p. 75) on the Argentine experience, where
the study concludes that “Given the lower-than-expected traﬃc levels, the investment
amounts agreed in the contracts are likely to be unnecessary and uneconomic”.
11This claim can be supported by an analogy with the problem analysed in Panteghini
(2005), who studies the eﬀects of an asymmetric tax scheme, whereby only “excess” proﬁts
are taxed. This paper studies incremental and sequential investments made by a represen-
tative ﬁrm, assuming that the lifetime of investment is stochastic and subject to technical
obsolescence. When the investment project expires, the ﬁrm gets an option to restart.
According to Bernanke’s (1983) Bad News Principle, it is shown that the asymmetric tax
scheme does not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decisions. This suggests that the same holds for proﬁt
sharing, which also entails an asymmetric extraction of proﬁts.
6Investment Given that price is regulated, investment is the main deci-
sion undertaken by the ﬁrm. The vast literature on investment theory (e.g.,
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) points out that investment decisions entail two in-
terrelated issues: how much to invest, and when. We thus assume that the
ﬁrm has an intial investment opportunity (of endogenous amount and tim-
ing) and that the ﬁrm can further expand its capital at any future instant t.
The optimal choice by the ﬁrm thus entails a whole investment proﬁle (how
much to invest at each point in time).
Once invested, K is irreversible, in that it can be increased but not de-
creased. Investment is therefore a sunk cost. Unlike the traditional industrial
organization literature on sunk costs, we do not consider a one-oﬀ investment
decision whose amount and timing are given, but a sequence of decisions in
continuous time. The explicit introduction of time is important to capture
the very notion of proﬁt sharing. A purely static model would not be appro-
priate to analyse the eﬀects of a regulatory constraint which may vary over
time depending on proﬁts.
Proﬁtd y n a m i c s Investment decisions are driven by proﬁts. Given
that Ψ and p are deterministic while demand is uncertain, (5) implies that
current proﬁts include all relevant information about future proﬁtability and
are thus crucial in inducing a ﬁrm to invest. Therefore, it becomes very
important to analyse how proﬁts evolve over time.
To this end, we ﬁrst derive the dynamics of the demand function. Given
(1), (5) (3) and (4), it is straightforward to obtain
dqt = αqjqtdt + σqqtdzt, (6)
where αqj ≡− η(RPI − xj), j = l,h. Deﬁning the ﬁrm’s revenues as Θt ≡
ptqt, using equations (2), (3) and applying Itô’s lemma, as shown in the
Appendix, we can ﬁnally write the proﬁtd y n a m i c sa s
dΠt = ΨK(K(t))Θ(t)dK + Ψ(K(t))dΘ(t) (7)
≡ Γ(Kt)ΠtdKt + Πt[αjdt + σdzt],
where αj ≡ (1 − η)(RPI − xj) is the expected growth rate, σ = σq is the
standard deviation, while Γ(Kt) ≡ ΨK (Kt)/Ψ(Kt) > 0 captures the direct
eﬀect of investment on the mark-up. From (7), we can see that in each t
7investment aﬀects the level of proﬁt through the marginal mark-up factor,
which depends on the stock of capital. In particular if no new investments
are undertaken, dK =0and proﬁts are driven only by demand changes and
the price cap.
In the next section we will focus on the investment decisions of a regulated
ﬁrm. For simplicity, hereafter, we will omit the time variable t.
3 The investment decision
The ﬁrm’s problem is one of choosing optimal capital accumulation by max-
imizing the expected present value of proﬁts Π(K,Θ) ≡ Ψ(K)Θ, taking into
account both proﬁt sharing regulation as well as the value of K.D e ﬁning pK
as the price of capital we can write the ﬁrm’s problem
V (K,Θ)=m a x K E0
£R ∞
0 e−rt[Π(K,Θ) − pKdK]dt | K0 = K, Θ0 = Θ
¤
,
s.t. dK ≥ 0,with K ∈ (0,K] and (7) for all t.
(8)
where E0 [·] is the expectation operator. Function V (·) is assumed to be
twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The expectation in equation (8) is taken
with respect to the joint distribution of K and Θ and it is conditional on
t h ei n f o r m a t i o na v a i l a b l ea tt i m ez e r ot a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ep r o ﬁt sharing
constraint and the irreversibility constraint.12
Without installation costs, the rate of growth of capital is unbounded
where dK is the investment process. These expansions are also assumed to
be irreversible.13
Solving problem (8) we can prove the following:
12The dynamics of Θ are described in the Appendix (see (18)).
13Technically, this means that, by exercising the option to delay, the ﬁrm acquires a
compound option to expand, which consists of a continuum of American call options,
each for any dK. For any given starting value of capital, the ﬁrm can exercise a call
option to expand capital. After the exercise of such an option, the ﬁrm obtains another
American call option allowing it to undertake a further increment. The compound option
is completely exercised when the ﬁrm reaches K.
8Proposition 1 The ﬁrm invests (increases K) every time current proﬁtg o e s











ΨK(K), for K ∈ ( e K,K].
(9)
where e K is the amount of capital such that
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δ(xj) ≡ r − αj for j = l,h.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 describes the eﬀects of regulation on capital accumulation.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is that proﬁt sharing is neutral for low
levels of investment (K<e K). Only incremental investments raising capital
beyond e K will be delayed. Notice that e K is endogenous but it does not vary
over time.
As shown in Proposition 1, investment depends on xl and neither on xh
nor on the switch point e K (and, equivalently, on ˜ Π).14 As proﬁt sharing
does not aﬀect the initial investment decision, the neutrality result found in
Panteghini and Scarpa (2003a) in a two-period set-up is conﬁrmed.
To better analyse the investment proﬁle over time, it is convenient to
make use of Figure 1 below. Notice that while the proﬁt sharing threshold
e Π is a constant, the optimal investment trigger value Π∗(K) is a function
of K. Since the marginal proﬁtability of K is decreasing, this function is
increasing.
14If e Π were below this trigger point, the price scheme would already start with xj =
xh and the two regulatory regimes would in practice coincide. This would not be a very
interesting case, since the two regimes would collapse to a price cap one with xh. In order
to have an actual alternative to price cap, we must assume that e Π is larger than the trigger
point. In this way, regulation starts with a value of xj = xl, which is made more stringent
at a later stage, if proﬁtg o e sb e y o n de Π.
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Figure 1: Capital accumulation K as a function of current proﬁt Π.A s
current proﬁtg o e sb e y o n de Π, price regulation gets tighter and only a higher
proﬁtl e v e l ,Π∗
PS( e K), will induce further investment.
10For K ∈ (0,K) the investment function determined in (9) consists of two
parts.
The ﬁrst one, for K ∈ (0, e K], indicates that the ﬁrm increases capital
when current proﬁts go beyond the trigger point denoted by Π∗
PC(K) in (9)
for any value of K. This function does not depend on xh, i.e. it does not
depend on the existence of a proﬁt sharing scheme (and would thus emerge
in the optimal investment policy with a pure price cap).
The second part shows that proﬁt sharing aﬀects investment only when
K reaches e K.A s ρ(xh) >ρ (xl), Π∗
PS( e K) > Π∗
PC( e K). This implies that
the level of current proﬁt, required to convince the ﬁrm to expand its plant,
jumps upwards when K = e K.P r o ﬁt sharing, by increasing the value of
the current proﬁt beyond which the ﬁrm decides to expand its plant, delays
further investment.
More precisely, when current proﬁts reach the threshold e Π for the ﬁrst
time, K is increased to e K. Further marginal increases in Π, however, will
not be suﬃcient to trigger further investments: when current proﬁts happen
to be in the interval [e Π;Π∗
PS( e K)],t h eﬁrm will not increase capital beyond
e K. Given the tighter regulatory constraint, further investments would be
justiﬁed only when demand is so high that Π > Π∗
PS( e K).O n l ya tt h i sp o i n t
will the ﬁrm ﬁnd it optimal to increase K: given that current proﬁti st h e
best estimate of future proﬁt, for high current proﬁt levels giving up market
opportunities would be too expensive. When K reaches its maximum level
K, further investments are impossible and the ﬁrm can only produce at the
regulated price.15
If the ﬁrm already has a given capital level K but demand conditions
worsen so that current proﬁtf a l l sb e l o wΠ∗
PC(K), given irreversibility, the
optimal policy is not to invest (keeping K constant). The ﬁrm waits until
proﬁts move above Π∗
PC(K) and at this point it will invest in order to keep
proﬁts in line with the optimal policy curve (9). This happens as long as
Π∗
PC(K) < Π < Π∗
PC( e K)=e Π, and the new capital level remains below the
threshold given by e K.
As for uncertainty, notice that an increase in the standard deviation σ
is equivalent to a mean-preserving spread,16 so that we measure uncertainty
15Quite obviously, if e K ≥ K,p r o ﬁt sharing never interferes with investment decisions
and Π∗ (K)=Π∗
PC(K) for all relevant values of K. In this case, a loose proﬁt sharing
constraint would be neutral with respect to investment decisions.
16In order to see that the quality of results would not change, we could add to (5) another
11through σ. It is thus straightforward to see that an increase in this parameter
increases the term ρ(xj) via β1(xj),f o rj = l,h.T h i sr a i s e st h eo p t i m a l
threshold Π∗ (K) for any given K, so that greater uncertainty implies lower
willingness to invest by the ﬁrm (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 369-370).17
4 Welfare analysis
So far, we have seen that proﬁt sharing may discourage investment if it in-
tervenes for low levels of proﬁt. In terms of social welfare, however, this
negative eﬀect may be oﬀset by the positive eﬀect of proﬁt sharing on con-
sumer surplus. In this section, we ﬁr s td e t e r m i n et h en e tw e l f a r ee ﬀect of
proﬁt sharing regulation. We will then compute the optimal switch level ˜ Π∗.
The starting point of our welfare analysis is the following standard welfare
function:
W(xl,x h; e Π)=S(xl,x h; e Π)+λV (xl,x h; e Π), (11)
where S is the consumer surplus, V is the ﬁrm’s value and λ ≤ 1 is the
weight of proﬁts in the welfare function (in line with the standard regulation
literature since Baron and Myerson, 1982).
Our welfare analysis starts from a basic trade-oﬀ.P r o ﬁt sharing, which
entails a quicker decrease in prices, increases consumer surplus. However,
unless the threshold e Π is very high, proﬁt sharing may delay investment,
which given the price dynamics has no eﬀe c to nc o n s u m e r sb u td o e sa ﬀect
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Is proﬁt sharing desirable? Can we identify an optimal
value for e Π? We try and answer these questions by analysing in turn the two
main arguments of the welfare function.
Let’s now compute the ﬁrm’s value. It is straightforward to show the
following.
Wiener process, uncorrelated with dzt,i . e . :
dγt
γt = σdzt + ∆σdwt, and E(dztdwt)=0 .
Given its properties, the expected valueE(dγt) is still nil, while the variance is E(dγ2
t)=
(σ2 + ∆σ2)γt
2dt. For further details on this point see, for example, Abel (1985).
17Capital irreversibility and demand uncertainty highlight the fact that the possibility of
deciding when and whether to invest is highly valuable to the ﬁrm. Without uncertainty,
the investment decision collapses to a problem of optimal timing where the ﬁrm determines
immediately the preferred time for phasing the investment.
12Lemma 1 For any initial value of K<e K,t h eﬁrm’s value may be written
as
V (xl,x h; e Π)=V
PC(xl)+∆V
PS(xl,x h; e Π), (12)
where V PC(xl) is the project value under pure price-cap regulation, and ∆V PS(xl,x h; e Π) <
0 represents the decrease in the ﬁrm’s value due to proﬁts h a r i n g .
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix,
∆V
PS(xl,x h; e Π)=A
PS(K;xl,x h)Θ
β1(xl),
where APS(xl,x h; e Π) ≡−  c
¡
K
¢ e Π1−β1(xl),   ≡
δ(xh)−δ(xl)






z=K ΨK(z)Ψ(z)β1(xl)−1dz > 0,s ot h a tAPS(xl,x h; e Π) < 0. The expected loss
due to a proﬁt sharing regulation intervenes only as Π reaches the threshold
e Π.T h et e r m  represents the eﬀects of the tighter regulation which follows
proﬁt sharing. The formula for ∆V PS(xl,x h; e Π) shows that the loss in the
ﬁrm’s value is proportional to the expected value of the incremental invest-
ments which the ﬁrm decides to delay because of proﬁt sharing.
This means that the value of the ﬁrm is negatively aﬀected by proﬁt
sharing, relative to a pure price cap: it is easy to verify that
∂V PS(K,Θ)
∂˜ Π > 0
(a more relaxed proﬁt constraint increases the ﬁrm’s value). To some extent,
this is natural, in that the very notion of proﬁt sharing comes from the idea
that a scheme which yields an excessively imbalanced distribution of rents is
undesirable18.
The consumer surplus under proﬁt sharing can be computed consider-
ing the present discounted value of the integral below the demand function.
Proﬁt sharing aﬀects consumer surplus through its eﬀect on price. Given
that proﬁt sharing may or may not take place, depending on whether or not
proﬁts go beyond ˜ Π, consumer surplus - analogously to V -e m b o d i e st h ef u -
ture value of what can be obtained at a later stage because of proﬁt sharing.
As shown in the Appendix, we can prove the following.
Lemma 2 For any given value of e K<K, the present value of consumer
surplus may be written as
S(xl,x h; e Π)=S
PC(xl)+∆S
PS(xl,x h; e Π), (13)
18Note that also the rate-of-return regulation scheme, still prevailing in a large part of
the US, is based on the idea that restraining monopoly rents is a goal in itself.
13where SPC(xl) is the consumer surplus under price cap regulation and ∆SPS(xl,x h; e Π)
i st h ei n c r e a s ei nc o n s u m e rs u r p l u sd u et op r o ﬁts h a r i n g .
Proof. See Appendix.
A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,SPC(xl) is a perpetual rent which depends on
price but does not directly depend on K: consumer surplus depends on the
regulated price, which in turn depends on the ﬁrm’s choices only when they
a r es u c ha st ot r i g g e rp r o ﬁt sharing. The term
∆S
PS(xl,x h; e Π)=B
PS(xl,x h; e Π)Θ
β1(xl),





, represents the expected
value of the increase in the consumer surplus due to proﬁt sharing (and
∆SPS(xl,x h; e Π)=0for xl = xh,w h e nn op r o ﬁt sharing takes place). Given
that β1(xl) > 1,a ni n c r e a s ei ne Π decreases consumer surplus: if proﬁt sharing
takes place “later”, consumers’ welfare is lower. Analogously, an increase in
xh increases ∆SPS(xl,x h; e Π).
Taking account of (12) and (13), the welfare function (11) can be written
as
W(xl,x h; e Π)=W
PC(xl)+∆W
PS(xl,x h; e Π), (14)
where WPC(xl) ≡ SPC(xl)+λV PC(xl) is the welfare level under pure price-
cap and ∆WPS(xl,x h; e Π) ≡ ∆SPS(xl,x h; e Π)+λ∆V PS(xl,x h; e Π) measures
the beneﬁta r i s i n gf r o mp r o ﬁt sharing. Proﬁt sharing may or may not be de-
sirable, depending on the sign of ∆WPS(xl,x h; e Π), and thus we concentrate
on this term. As shown in the Appendix, the following holds
Proposition 2 The net beneﬁtf r o mp r o ﬁt sharing is
∆W











A ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,p r o ﬁt sharing may have a positive or negative
impact on welfare (∆WPS T 0). In line with intuition, the welfare gain due
to proﬁt sharing decreases with λ, i.e. the weight attached to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.




, which measures the ability of the possible
expansion of investment to decrease costs, also enters with a negative sign. As
14shown in Proposition 1, proﬁt sharing may delay investment, and when the
potential positive eﬀects of investment opportunities are substantial, proﬁt
sharing may decrease welfare.
The eﬀect of proﬁt sharing also depends on the actual value of e Π,a n do u r
analysis allows us to determine the optimal level that should trigger proﬁt
sharing. The regulator’s problem is one of choosing
˜ Π
∗ =a r gm a x∆W
PS
³
xl,x h; e Π
´
.
To ﬁnd a closed-form solution we assume that Ψ(K) is a Cobb-Douglas
function, i.e. Ψ(K)=Kε with ε ∈ (0,1). A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,w e
prove the following:
Proposition 3 Let e Π∗ be the optimal level of proﬁt which triggers proﬁt
sharing, i.e. the threshold point ensuring the condition
MS = MC, (16)















If ε is low enough ( ε<1− λ
β1(xl)) the optimal level of proﬁt e Π∗ is ﬁnite.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in (16), the LHS of (16) measures the marginal consumer sur-
plus (MS), while the RHS is the weighted marginal cost (MC), i.e. the







This level can be seen as the product between the rate of return (adjusted
for irreversibility) ρ(xl) and the cost of the “critical” investment (adjusted
for productivity)
pK h K
ε . This means that, if the marginal productivity of
investment decreases suﬃciently quickly, a regulatory scheme with a proﬁt
sharing element is preferable to a pure price cap scheme. On the contrary,
when ε is large enough, the marginal productivity of capital does not decrease
very sharply as K increases, and delaying capital accumulation causes a more
substantial welfare loss.
15To get a better intuition of the result, let us ﬁnally analyse the determi-
nants of e Π∗. Results of comparative statics exercises are summarised in Table
1.
Table 1: the determinants of ˜ Π∗
MS MC ˜ Π∗
σ + + ?
λ 0 + +
K 0 + +
The ﬁrst element we can look at is uncertainty, namely the standard
deviation of demand (σ). Its eﬀect is twofold. On the one hand, an increase in
demand uncertainty raises the ﬁrm’s option value and, therefore, the required
minimum return (ρ). On the other hand, given the capital level, a higher
volatility of demand increases the marginal consumer surplus; consumers
beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s good news (which may trigger a higher value of the
x factor) without suﬀering at the margin due to the bad news. Therefore
uncertainty has an ambiguous eﬀect on ˜ Π∗.
A higher value of the weight of proﬁt in the welfare function (11) tends to
increase the optimal value of e Π through its eﬀect on e K; given that consumer
surplus matters less to social welfare, the incentives to invest become more
important to social welfare and proﬁt sharing should intervene at a later
stage.
A similar eﬀect occurs when K rises. If proﬁt sharing discourages in-
vestments, then its negative impact on welfare is higher, when investment
opportunities are more relevant (i.e. the maximum possible level of capital K
is larger). When K is large, a high level of e Π is useful to delay this negative
eﬀect.
5 Conclusions and extensions
Our paper has shown how proﬁt sharing does not delay a ﬁrm’s start-up
investment relative to a pure price cap scheme. Proﬁt sharing does not nec-
essarily aﬀect total investment either, if the threshold for proﬁt sharing is
high enough. We have also identiﬁed conditions under which “some” proﬁt
sharing is actually optimal, stressing that proﬁt sharing should be less strin-
gent in sectors where there are bigger investment opportunities.
Uncertainty is essential to this result, in that without it, investment levels
(even with irreversibility) only depend on a very standard deﬁnition of their
16proﬁtability as the value of waiting is zero. With uncertainty, the expected
net present value of an investment depends on the option value, which is pos-
itive because of uncertainty. This leads to the bad news principle (Bernanke,
1983), which in turn is what drives our key result.
It is worth stressing that proﬁt sharing is usually subject to three related
but distinct criticisms, which can be discussed in our framework, namely that
proﬁt sharing (i) reduces the incentive to innovate, (ii) leads a ﬁrm to hide
its proﬁt through appropriate accountancy practices or (iii) through direct
increases in costs. Let us analyse them separately.
In the light of our results, the statement that proﬁt sharing leads to
ineﬃciency and lack of investment (or innovation) should be qualiﬁed. We
have seen that if the proﬁt sharing threshold is too low, this regulatory
scheme may indeed delay improvements. Thus, the presence of a dis-incentive
to invest in innovations depends on how tight the proﬁtc o n s t r a i n ti s . I n
industries in particular, where innovation is crucial, this potential welfare
loss should be seriously considered.
Coming to the second claim, namely that proﬁt sharing leads to accoun-
tancy manoeuvers aimed at hiding proﬁts in order to avoid the tightening of
regulatory constraints, we have to consider the following. Manipulating the
accounts in order to avoid or delay proﬁt sharing is a natural consequence
of any mechanism which relates regulation to the ﬁnancial performance of a
ﬁrm. Therefore, any regulation based on the ﬁrm’s accounts must consider
some additional control in the form of forcing the ﬁrm to keep regulatory
accounts separate (and strictly monitored). In practice, however, it is un-
clear whether this is a peculiarity of proﬁt sharing. Even “pure” price cap
schemes need to have a periodic price review, during which an assessment of
a ﬁrm’s cost is always carried out. In this perspective, the diﬀerence between
proﬁt sharing and a pure price cap seems to be mainly the frequency of such
controls.
It should be noted, however, that per se these possible accounting tricks
are not directly ineﬃcient (apart from their implications on the eﬀectiveness
of regulation and on its cost). In this respect, the third common claim, that
proﬁt sharing leads to unnecessarily high costs (“gold plating”), is even more
serious in that - if this were the case - then proﬁt sharing would entail a clear
ineﬃciency. This eﬀect could actually emerge if proﬁt sharing took place
w i t had e l a y ,s ot h a td e c r e a s i n go u rp r o ﬁts in the current year would allow
us another year of “softer” regulation, in which higher proﬁts could possibly
more than compensate the current “waste” of money. Introducing such delays
17in a dynamic model like the one we presented, would mean working either
within a discrete-time framework or with diﬀerential and diﬀerence equations
a tt h es a m et i m e-o n et h i n gw h i c hi np r i n c i p l ei sp e r f e c t l yf e a s i b l eb u ti n
practice quite cumbersome.
Note again, however, that even ﬁrms subject to a pure price cap with
periodic price reviews may be tempted to do the same. As price reviews are
carried out on the basis of the accounts of a speciﬁc year, if the accounts con-
sidered for the price review show high costs, then the price review should be
more favourable to the ﬁrm. Moreover, if a ﬁrm manages to obtain a higher
price, the consequences of this achievement refer to the whole regulatory pe-
riod (between one price review and the next one). Therefore, the temptation
to inﬂate costs in the year considered for the review are particularly high, as
t h eh i g hc o s ti no n ey e a rs h o u l db et r a d e do ﬀ against higher prices for the
following years (usually 3 to 5 years). The general problem is that even pure
price caps in practice embody elements of proﬁt evaluation (if not explicit
sharing) and this reduces the practical diﬀerences between the two models.
Despite its apparent complexity, necessary to incorporate uncertainty and
time in a realistic way, the model still rests on somehow restrictive assump-
tions. However, it is easy to show how the model can accommodate at least
two additional factors.
Regulatory risk. We have explicitly modeled market uncertainty, while
regulatory risk - the possibility that the regulator committed to a price cap
mechanism betrays expectations and changes the x factor because observed
proﬁts are very high - raises diﬀerent issues. If revenues may be revised
downwards because proﬁts are “too high”, then the ﬁrm’s choices will be
aﬀected.
Panteghini and Scarpa (2003b) tackle the issue of whether the introduc-
tion of earnings sharing provisions solves this problem, with an investment
of given size, showing how uncertainty which intervenes in good states of
the world (the risk that high proﬁts will be partially shared) does not aﬀect
investment decisions. In the framework we analyze here, it would be easy to
show that the same conclusion applies to the initial (start-up) investment.
However, regulatory risk may aﬀect the size of total investment, and therefore
the expansion decisions. Would earnings sharing be a good way to neutralize
this eﬀect? Every decision to expand the initial investment is taken looking
at the future expected value of that expansion. At that moment, the logic
governing the decision is the same as the one underlying the start-up. There-
fore, regulatory risk linked to high proﬁts does not modify the comparison
18between proﬁt sharing and pure price cap that we have developed in the
previous section.
Two-sided proﬁt sharing. Many schemes with proﬁt sharing do not
only intervene when proﬁts are too high, but when proﬁts are low as well. In
this way, the x factor can be adjusted downwards if demand or cost condi-
tions worsen and proﬁts fall below a given threshold. This would make “bad
news” less “bad” and is therefore not neutral to investment decisions: this
sort of insurance against market risks provides an additional incentive to in-
vest. Therefore, Proposition 1 would be modiﬁed in that a two-sided earning
sharing scheme encourages the ﬁrm to invest sooner than with a pure price
cap. Expansion investments would equally be encouraged, so that the under-
investment result of Proposition 1 should be qualiﬁed: proﬁts h a r i n gl e a d s
to underinvestment (in the sense of Proposition 1) if it is one-sided, while
the analysis with two-sided proﬁt sharing would lead to a more ambiguous
result.
The empirical analyses of the eﬀects of earnings sharing schemes on in-
vestments do not yield clear-cut conclusions, and our results indicate good
reasons why that may be so. However, there is room for further research. In
particular some of the parameters of this model, such as the values of x fac-
tors, are set by the regulator. Thus an explicit framework taking into account
the determination of these values would represent a valuable extension.
196 Appendix
In this Appendix we will prove our main results.
6.1 Derivation of (7)
Let’s deﬁne the ﬁrm’s revenues as Θt ≡ ptqt.U s i n g( 2 )a n d( 6 )w ec a nd e r i v e
the dynamics of revenues
dΘt = αjΘtdt + σqΘtdzt, (18)
Given (18) and the deﬁnition of proﬁt, the derivation of (7) is straightforward.
It is worth noting that Θt represents the state variable of the investment
problem. However, proﬁt sharing intervenes whenever proﬁts, rather than
revenues, reach a threshold level e Π. To give readers a better intuition of
results, we will thus express our ﬁndings in terms of the regulated state
variable Πt, rather than Θt. In particular, we will use the following switch
level as
e Θ(K) ≡ ˜ Π/Ψ(K). (19)
The proofs will then be concluded by resetting results in terms of the regu-
lated state variable Π.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let’s apply dynamic programming to the ﬁrm’s value (8). We can thus write
V (K,Θ)=Π(K,Θ)dt + e
−rdtE0 [V (K,Θ + dΘ)],
Expanding the right-hand side and using Itô’s lemma we obtain





Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to K, and deﬁning v(K,Θ) ≡ VK(K,Θ),w e
obtain the following diﬀerential equation















β(β − 1) + (r − δ(xl))β − r =0 .
The index l in ai(K;xl) indicates that x = xl, i.e. that proﬁts h a r i n gi s
not in place. The interpretation of equation (22) is then transparent. The
contribution of the Kth unit of capital to the proﬁt ﬂow, when the existing
stock of capital is K, is given by ΠK (K,Θ) ≡ ΨK(K)Θ, which is expected
to grow at the rate αl until the threshold ˜ Π is reached, and at rate αh
afterwards. Thus, deﬁning   ≡
δ(xh)−δ(xl)
δ(xl)δ(xh) > 0 and e T a st h ee x p e c t e dt i m eo f




























As usual (23) and (24) are the VMC and SPC for the ﬁrm’s optimal policy.
Moreover, (25) imposes the irreversibility constraint on capital dK ≥ 0.21
The last condition (26) imposes K ≤ K.














20For further details on the boundary conditions see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 6).
21In other words, when Θ is very small the expected present value of the last unit of
capital installed is close to zero. Therefore, the value of the marginal option to scrap it is
almost inﬁnite.
21Using (19), and substituting (22) into (23) and (24), we have
ΠK(K,Θ∗)





+ a1(K;xl)(Θ∗)β1(xl) = pK,
ΠK(K,Θ∗)





+ β1(xl)a1(K;xl)(Θ∗)β1(xl) =0 .
Easy computations yield Θ∗
PC(K) ≡ ρ(xl)
pK
ΨK(K) for Θ < e Θ(K). Multiplying







for Π < e Π. (27)
Since ΨK(K) is decreasing in K, this identiﬁes an upward-sloping curve.
















Finally, we need to show that the investment policy (27) is viable and






or multiplying both sides for Ψ( ˜ K),
e Π = Π
∗
PC( ˜ K). (29)
Given decreasing returns to scale, it is easy to show that ˜ K exists and is
unique. Furthermore, for all K ≤ ˜ K it turns out that Π∗
PC(K) ≤ e Π which
concludes the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o f .
Let us now turn to the case where ˜ K ≤ K ≤ K. Notice that now it may
well happen that, for given K>˜ K, proﬁt ﬁrst goes beyond ˜ Π, while at a
later stage Π ≤ ˜ Π. In this case, in line with the spirit of the mechanism at
stake, the price cap goes back to its original level. Recalling (8), the Bellman
equations will be
rV(K,Θ)=
= Π(K,Θ)+( r − δ(xl))ΘVΘ (K,Θ)+σ2
2 Θ2VΘΘ (K,Θ)




= Π(K,Θ)+( r − δ(xh))ΘVΘ (K,Θ)+σ2
2 Θ2VΘΘ (K,Θ)
for Π ≥ e Π.
(31)
Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, the contribution of the Kth unit of
capital to the ﬁrm’s value can be evaluated using (22)-(26) for Π ≤ ˜ Π with













β(β − 1) + (r − δ(xh))β − r =0 .
The boundary conditions are
v(K,Θ
∗; ˜ Π)=pK (33)
vΘ(K,Θ
∗; ˜ Π)=0 (34)
a2(K;xh)=0 (35)
a1(K;xh)=0 (36)











for Π ≥ e Π (37)






















23To complete the proof we must now show that ρ(xl) <ρ (xh) for xl <x h.
















































































































































∝ f (δ(xj)). (39)
G i v e n( 3 9 )w em u s tn o wp r o v et h a tf (δ(xj)) > 0 for δ(xj) ∈ (0,r]. Let’s













´ > 0, for δ(xj) ∈ (0,r]. (40)
24Moreover it is easy to ascertain that
limδ(xj)→0+ f (δ(xj)) > 0,
f (r) > 0. (41)
Given (40) and (41) we can state that f (δ(xj)) > 0 and, hence,
∂ρ(xj)
∂δ(xj) > 0,
for δ(xj) ∈ (0,r]. This means that, holding (39), we have ρ(xl) <ρ (xh) for
xl <x h. This concludes the proof.¥
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1
To compute the ﬁrm’s value let’s start with the interval K ≥ e K.S o l v i n g













βi(xh) for Π ≥ e Π. (42)
In equation (42), the ﬁrst term is the expected value of proﬁt ﬂows if K is
held constant at its current level. The term A1(K;xh)Θβ1(xh) measures the
overall value of the ﬁrm’s (call) options to expand and is thus positive. The
term A2(K;xh)Θβ2(xh) is the expected future gain due to looser regulation
(with the switch from xh to xl ) taking place whenever Π < e Π.F o r t h i s
reason A2(K,xh) is positive as well.
Let’s next focus on the region Π(K,Θ) ∈ (0, e Π). Solving (30) yields
V
³









βi(xl) for Π ≤ e Π. (43)
To compute the value function, we use the boundary condition V (K,0) = 0,
which implies that A2(K;xl)=0 . The other term A1(K;xl)Θβ1(xl) represents
the consequences of reaching the proﬁt sharing constraint in the future (from
above) if the proﬁt ﬂow is reduced. This implies that A1(K;xl) must be
negative.
S of a rw eh a v et h r e ec o n s t a n t sA1(K;xh),A 2(K;xh) and A1(K;xl) to be
determined. To this end, we assume that the value function is continuously




i=1 Ai(K;xh)˜ Θ(K)βi(xh) =
=
˜ Π





i=1 βi(xh)Ai(K;xh)(˜ Θ(K))βi(xh) =
=
˜ Π
δ(xl) + β1(xl)A1(K;xl)(˜ Θ(K))β1(xl).
(45)
















Suppose now that K ≤ ˜ K. In this case the proﬁt sharing constraint is never
binding and for the ﬁrm’s value the only eﬀective threshold is the investment
policy Π∗
PC(K).
For Π ∈ (0,Π∗
PC(K)), solving (20), the value function is:
V
³









βi(xl) for Π ∈ (0,Π
∗
PC(K)). (47)
Again, to compute (47) we use the boundary condition V (K,0) = 0, which
implies that A2(K;xl)=0 . Unlike (43), the term A1(K;xl)Θβ1(xl) represents
the value of the ﬁrm’s optimal future capacity expansion, in response to the
evolution of Π towards the optimal investment policy Π∗(K). Yet, unlike (42),






















23Note that if ˜ K = K the constraint ˜ Π disappears.
26and
A













where  >0. This means that the introduction of a proﬁt sharing threshold
decreases the ﬁrm’s value.
The comparison of (27) and (37) involves a change in the optimal policy
during the period of optimization, i.e. there is a discontinuous jump in the
optimal policy at K = e K. However, following Kamien and Schwartz (1991),
we introduce a necessary condition at point ( e K,Π∗( e K)), according to which























where, using (27) and (37), we deﬁne Π∗
PC( e K) and Π∗
PS( e K) as the optimal
policy immediately before and after tighter regulation. Condition (49) en-
sures that regime switches do not cause any discrete change in the ﬁrm’s










PS(xl,x h; e Π)=A
PS(K;xl,x h)Θ
β1(xl).
The Lemma is thus proven.¥
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Let’s assume that a lower bound for quantity exists, deﬁned as q. The ex-
pected value of consumer surplus can be written as:
































































































Therefore, (50) can be rewritten as
































PS(xl,x h; e Π), (51)







r is the consumer surplus under price cap reg-






, is the expected increase in the consumer surplus once proﬁt
s h a r i n gb e c o m e ss t r i n g e n t .T h u sw eo b t a i n( 1 3 ) .
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (47), (48), and (51), we obtain (11) in the text, where WPC ≡ SPC +
λV PC is the welfare function under price-cap regulation and the second term
is given by












Using (52) we easily obtain (15).¥
286.6 Proof of Proposition 3




















The ﬁrst order condition is
∂∆WPS(xl,xh;h Π)


















´β1(xl)−2 ∂ h K(h Π)
∂h Π =0 .
(54)
Using (54) we obtain
∂∆WPS(xl,x h; e Π)
∂e Π
























































































29Given Ψ(K)=Kε with ε ∈ (0,1) we have ΨK(K) <
Ψ(K)
K for any K.


















Next, substituting (57) and (58) into (55a) we easily obtain
∂∆WPS(xl,x h; e Π)
∂e Π













Using (59), and applying the Envelope Theorem, the second order condition
holds, i.e.:

























= e K. (60)
















Substituting (60) into (61) it is straightforward to show that if ε<1− λ
β1(xl),









≤ 1. This im-
plies that K
ε
≤ 1 and, hence, K ≤ 1. Using (16), and computing partial
d e r i v a t i v e so fM Sa n dM C ,w eh a v e :
24See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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